A family of elliptic curves for cryptographic use is proposed for which the determination of the order of the corresponding algebraic group is much easier than in the general case. This makes it easier to meet the cryptographic requirement that this order have a large prime factor. Another advantage of this farniliy is that the group operation simplifies slightly. Explicit numerical examples are given that are suitable for practical use.
Introduction
An exponential function and a corresponding discrete logarithm function can be defined in every finite cyclic group [Massey 19831 . There appears to be no reason why the exponential function in the multiplicative group of a finite field should be the hardest one to invert and therefore the best candidate for a one-way function. An attractive alternative is to use a cyclic subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field. There is evidence [Miller 19861 that the discrete logarithm defined for a cyclic subgroup of this group is much more difficult to compute than that in the multiplicative group of a finite field.
Some basic definitions
We describe here briefly how to calculate in a group of points on an elliptic curve. For a more complete treatment of the theory of elliptic curves, see [Koblitz 1987] , [ Hartshome 19831 .
The group of points on an elliptic curve over an arbitrary field can be defined as the set of solutions (x,y) of a certain third-order algebraic equation, including the "point" at infinity (w,w) which is the neutral element of the group, together with an operation on these "points". In a field with characteristic p >3, the general Weierstrass equation can be reduced by means of coordinate transformations to the form y2=x3+ax+b, whereas for characteristic p =3 it can only be reduced reduced to y2+y=x3+ax+b. The condition for nonsingularity is 3 2 4a +27b d ) ; the group of points of a singular elliptic curve is isomorphic to the multiplicative or additive group of the field over which the curve is defied [Husemoeller 1987, p.781. We will only deal with the two cases characteristic p = 2 and characteristic p > 3 because these are the cases of greatest practical interest. The group operation for these cases is defined as follows. To an arbitrary pair of points P and Q specified by their coordinates (xl,yl) and (x2,y2), respectively, the group operation assigns a third point P*Q with the coordinates (x3,y3). These coordinates are computed in the following way for characteristic p>3.
to y 2 3 =x +ax2+bx+c, and in the case of characteristic p =2 it can be (x3,y3) = (=,DO) when P=Q, P=(O,O) and P is an element of the group; x3=((3 x12+a)/(2yl))2-2 x1
In the case of characteristic p=2, the equations become (x3,y3) = (=,-) when P#Q and x1+x2 =O
when P#Q and x1+x2 a.
(x3,y3) = (=,-) when P=Q, P=(O,O) and P is an element of the group; ~3 = (~1 2 2 +a)
The geometric interpretation of the operation * becomes clear if one sketches an elliptic curve in the affine plane over the real numbers. To compute P*Q, one first joins these two points by a straight line. Algebraic considerations show that this line must intersect the curve at a third point. The point P*Q is the point whose x-coordinate is the same as for this third point and whose y-coordinate is the negative of the y-coordinate of this third point.
The order of the group
It is possible to implement the Diffie-Hellman public key-distribution system without knowing the order of the underlying cyclic group. However, the Pohlig-Silver-Hellman algorithm for computing discrete logarithms can be used in an arbitrary cyclic group and runs in time O ( 6 ) where p is the largest prime factor of the order of the group. Therefore it is vital to know that the order of the cyclic group is large enough-to provide cryptographic security. If we use the multiplicative group of a finite field this problem is trivial: the group order is just equal to pn-1. However, the computation of the order of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field is difficult in general. Schoofs algorithm to determine this order runs in polynomial time but is not very practical[ Schoof 19851.
A Cryptographically Useful Subclass of Elliptic Curves
To avoid cumbersome computation of the group order, we suggest the use of the subclass of elliptic curves having the coefficient a = 0 in their defining equation. These equations then read y2=x3+b for characteristic p > 3 and y2+y =x3+b for characteristic p = 2.
This specialization has been considered previously in cryptology for random bit generators [Kaliski 19871 . We observe that every nonzero coefficient b satisfies the nonsingularity condition. The following special properties for this specialization are well known.
Property 1 :Let p be a prime #2,3. If p 3 -1 (mod 3) the equation y2=x3+b has exactly p solutions (x,y) in G F ( P )~ (excluding the neutral element) for every b in GF(p) [Kaliski 19871 .
Property 2: The integer 3 does not divide pf-1 if and only if the integer f is odd and p = -l(mod 3) [Grosswald 19841. Property 3: Let m be an odd positive integer greater than 1. Then y2+y=x3+b has exactly 2m solutions (x,y) (excluding the neutral element) in GF(2m)2 [Lidl Niederreiter 19831. These properties combine to give the following recipe for group orders. P r Q D O S ition: The order of the group of the elliptic curve defined by y2=x3+b over GF@) with p i -l(mod 3) is p+l. The order of the group of the elliptic curve defined by y2+y=x3+b over GF(2m), where m is odd, is 2m+ 1.
Choice of the Elliptic Curve and Cyclic Subgroup 1. The case GF(p)
If p= -l(mod 3), it follows that p+l must be divisible by 3 and, since p is an odd prime, p+l is also divisible by 2. This means that the largest prime factor of the group order p+l will be achived if p+l is of the form p+l=2.3.p* where p* is another prime. If p+l=2.3.p* it is also very easy to find a generating element for the cyclic subgroup of order p* or greater to use as a base of the discrete logarithm. Since we have the free parameter b in the defining equations of the curves it is no problem to choose an arbitrary element and to compute its sixth power; if the result is not the neutral element, the order of this particular element is a multiple of p* and so cryptographically useful. 2. The case GF(2m) Because 2%l is not divisible by 2, the next smallest possible factor of the order 2"+1 is 3. Cryptographically, we want 2m+l=3p* where p* is a prime. Our computations have shown that this is indeed possible for some interesting m.
Numerical Results
The prime number theorem states that the probability that an integer selected arbitrarily in the interval [l,x] is a prime is l/ln(x). For p+l=6p*, we are interested in the probability that q and 6q-1 are both prime when q is randomly selected in the interval [ l,x] . For a rough estimate we may assume the two occurrences to be independent, so we have P(x and 6x-1 prime) -l/(ln(x) ln(6x-1)) If we want to have an x with hundred decimal digits we get This means that with an efficient prime number test (and a reasonably fast computer) it is feasible to search. As numerical results we get GF@): p*={ 1010+19, 1020+1267, 102l+367, 1050+4209, 1O1Oo+42337} and furthermore p*=28 '356'863'9 10'078'205'288'6 14'550'6 19'3 14'021'777 for which p=6p*-1=2127+24933 is prime. This, is the smallest prime greater than 2127 for which (p+1)/6 is also prime. For this curve which is convenient in computer arithmetic we also give the element (3,5) which lies on the curve defined over GF(p) through y2=x3-2 and has order p.
The second example of this kind is p*=1'537'228'672'809'132'109 for which p=6p*-1=263+16845 is prime. This is the smallest prime greater than 263 for which (p+1)/6 is prime. The element ( 3 3 again lies on the curve y2=x3-2 and has order p.
GF(2m):
If we take m=127 there exists the extremely simple irreducible polynomial g (~) = x l~~+ x + l and p*=(2127+1)/3 is prime. The element (x,x) has maximal order 2127+l on the elliptic curve it generates.
Taking m=61 and generating GF(261) with the irreducible polynomial G ( x ) = x~~+ x~+ x~+ x +~, we obtain elliptic curves of order 261+1=3p* whereby p*=(2G11+1)/3 is prime. The element (x,x) -the components being expressed in GF(2)[x]/(g(x)) -has order Z61+1 which is maximal on the elliptic curve it generates. What follows is a list of exponents m for which (2m+1)/3 is prime.
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